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ABSTRACT We describe intergenerational redistribution in Sweden the year 2003. 
The high Swedish tax ratio of around 50-60 percent of GDP per capita is partly 
explained by every individual getting a lot back in terms of transfers and part in 
government consumption. Another reason is that most transfers are taxed, which results 
in double counting some tax payments. Here we attempt to correct the age profile of net 
tax payment for these effects and compare these to the gross profiles. On a per capita 
basis we find, using this netting, that the mean age of tax payers drops from 55 to 48 
and that the taxes paid falls by 23.2 percent. We also look at age profiles of private and 
public consumption, and net private consumption, i.e., the difference between private 
disposable income and private consumption. We find that private net redistribution 
flows mainly from middle and old age to young ages, while net public transfers flow to 
both young and old.  
 
Svensk sammanfattning: Rapporten studerar intergenerationell omfördelning i Sverige 
för 2003, både den som sker genom offentlig sektor men även genom hushåll. Typiskt 
för Svenska institutionella förhållanden är dels en hög skattekvot kring 50-60 procent av 
BNP per capita dels en betydande offentlig konsumtion och transfereringar. Att 
skattekvoten är hög kan dock även förklaras med betydande dubbelräkning i vissa 
skattebetalningar genom att många offentliga transfereringar beskattas. Vi beräknar 
åldersprofiler över korrigerade skattekvoter som tar hänsyn till denna rundgång och 
jämför med okorrigerat mått. Vi finner att genomsnittsåldern för skattebetalaren 
förskjuts från 55 till 48 och att skatteinbetalningen faller med 23.2 procent när 
skattekvoten korrigeras för denna rundgång. Vi undersöker också åldersprofilerna för 
privat och offentlig konsumtion, och privata nettotransfereringar. Ett resultat är att 
privata nettotransfereringar i huvudsak går från gammal till ung, medan offentliga 
nettotransfereringar går till unga såväl som till äldre. 
  1 
1. Introduction 
Intergenerational redistribution in Sweden takes place through the public sector to an 
unusually large extent. The universal character of the benefit systems as well as the 
health care and education system results in a very high tax ratio of around 50-60 percent 
of GDP per capita making many economists (also in Sweden) wonder how the economy 
can work under such a tax burden (Thakur et al. 2003). Part of the answer is probably 
that virtually every individual gets a lot back in terms of transfers and part in 
government consumption. Another part may be that most transfers are taxed thus 
alleviating some otherwise troublesome marginal income effects but also effectively 
double counting some tax payments. Here we attempt to correct the age profile of net 
tax payment for these effects and compare these to the gross profiles. We also present 
patterns of private and public consumption. Taken together these reveal, as could be 
expected, that the sum of private and public consumption results in a very smooth life 
consumption. Lastly we describe briefly how net consumption, or savings, varies over 
different age groups. 
 
 
1. Institutional  background 
The Swedish welfare state is based on a quite extensive redistribution of resources 
across age cohorts. Due to the public organization of the redistribution this also holds 
across the members of any given birth cohort. Social policy is quite deliberately 
designed to promote dual-earner families rather than bread-winner households. Most 
transfer systems are tied to the individual’s labor force participation providing quite 
extensive income insurance to most of the population. There are exceptions to this rule 
like students and self-employed. Occupational benefit systems are in general not 
directly tied to individual employers but organized through collective agreements 
encompassing whole sectors of the economy. 
A major part of public consumption and tax collection is organized through local 
municipalities providing education at primary and secondary level as well as 
comprehensive public child care facilities and elderly care. The health care system is 
organized at the regional county level where also regional communication and 
transports are managed. 
Thus it may seem to be a fairly decentralized system. It must be noted though that 
within this system an elaborate regulation redistributes tax resources across the 
municipalities and counties according to demographic and geographic profiles and other 
key factors in order to ensure fair or equal conditions for the provision of social services 
over the whole country. This considerably weakens the link between the local tax base 
and the local provision of public services. 
1.1. Social  insurance 
The social insurance systems encompass much more than a public pension system. The 
central parts are administered by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency. Parental income 
insurance is provided both at child birth and in the event of children falling sick. 
Sickness insurance is compulsory and coverage provided by the employer for the first 
two weeks and only thereafter by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency. Health care 
  2provision at nominal fees (with a low annual cap) is available to all including subsidized 
prescription medicine. Privately provided health care is mostly financed by the 
government at the same conditions as the publicly provided care. Dental care for adults 
though is largely non-public with only a small subsidy. However, for children up to 20 
dental care is publicly financed. Unemployment insurance is provided through a number 
of unemployment funds in general connected with the trade unions but financed mainly 
through the government, fees accounting only for some 5 percent of benefits. Currently 
the new government intends to increase the share of self-financing and lower benefits.  
 
Schools are free. Also private schools are financed by the government, up to the 
secondary level. Day care for small children is provided with heavily subsidized and in 
general means tested fees. There is some rationing still in the day care system but today 
it is in general available for almost all pre-school children, at least for day time care. 
Provision of child care at inconvenient hours is provided but with rather large local 
variation. Child allowances at an amount of approximately 12 000 SEK ($1 500) per 
year and child are given to all parents up till the children are 16 (the per capita amounts 
are increasing somewhat with the number of children in the family) and, provided the 
children go to upper secondary school (more than 90 percent do), are extended as a 
study allowance until children are 19. Tertiary education is provided for free (except 
literature) but with rationing based on previous grades. A study loan system with a 
rather large subsidy is available for all students. Currently almost half of a birth cohort 
will enroll in tertiary education. 
 
These are the main universal systems but in addition there are also means tested support 
systems available at locally varying conditions. Elderly care and transportation for all 
people with difficulties in using other public and private transportation is also provided 
with some variation; whether publicly or privately provided and there are local variants 
of fee systems and the extent of services but the bulk is government financed (also if 
privately provided). Housing subsidies have been cut back heavily since the 1970s but 
are still available at a means tested basis and mostly support single household parents 
and some poor pensioners. There are also numerous support systems for mentally or 
physically challenged people at all ages. 
 
Although there are a lot of minor exceptions, income insurance is provided for the 
majority in the labor force but only up to a ceiling, but above this ceiling there are 
generally occupational insurance or private alternatives. In order to be fully covered you 
have to be qualified by some minimum of workforce participation and reasonable 
income in the near past. Labor force participation is therefore high, in general much 
higher than in other European countries, in particular for women and elderly. The 
systems have intentionally been designed for this and are aimed to support dual-earner 
families. Single earner families are supported as they fall below a poverty line but the 
bread winner (generally male but not always) has to earn fairly high income in order to 
keep standards of living at the average level. 
1.2. Tax  system 
Practically all income earners pay most of their income taxes to the municipality and 
county (municipality and county taxes vary with a few percentage points around 30 
percent as a flat rate on labor income). On top of this high income earners above an 
  3indexed ceiling pay another 20-25% to the state. The ceiling currently corresponds to 
something like 300 000 SEK or $45 000 USD in annual income. 
 
However, on top of this there are also quite substantial payroll taxes and social 
insurance fees as well as occupational insurance systems so that actual wage costs tend 
to be 45-55 percent higher than nominal gross wages. A minor base amount is 
deductible as are some work related expenses, mainly part of commuting costs. 
 
Capital income on the other hand is taxed at a flat rate of 30% against which interest 
payments and capital losses are deductible. There are separate property and wealth taxes 
but taxes on gifts and inheritances have been abolished and parliament is just about to 
decide on a termination of wealth taxes.  
 
Substantial value-added taxes on consumption (at different levels dependent on type of 
consumption 6, 12 or 25 percent) and some other indirect taxes provide another layer of 
the tax system. Taxes on energy, tobacco and alcohol are prominent among the indirect 
taxes and motivated by public health and environmental reasons. 
 
Private firms and companies are also taxed, but rules allowing for deductions and tax 
smoothing through reservations and similar devices in practice means that Swedish 
enterprises are fairly lightly taxed and many employees use small firms as tax shelters 
for part of their income. 
2.  Basic age profiles of income, taxes and consumption for 2003 
2.1. Age profiles of gross taxes and transfers 
In Sweden, many public transfers including pensions, sickness allowances, 
unemployment benefits, etc., are taxed as income. This creates a significant within-year 
feedback, that is, a circular flow through the tax and transfer system that tends to blow 
up the actual intergenerational flows between individuals. For example it is calculated 
by an official government report (SOU 2003:110) that the annual feedback over an 
individual’s whole life amounts to 45 percent of the entire redistributed resources.  
 
If this taxation were removed cross-country comparisons would become easier to 
interpret since many countries do not have taxable transfers to the same extent as 
Sweden and other European countries as the Netherlands for example. In the 
Intergenerational National Transfer Account project we are interested in the 
redistribution of resources between generations. As taxable transfers vary by age, e.g., 
pensions are paid out in old age while other transfers might be more evenly distributed 
over life; we are in the present chapter interested in comparing the tax ratio by age 
group in Sweden’s tax and transfer system when this feedback effect has been removed. 
But first we consider the age profiles of gross taxes and transfers. 
 
The data used here are from the Longitudinal INdividual DAta set (LINDA). LINDA is 
a large micro-data set drawn from income registers and population censuses.
1 It consists 
of a large panel of individuals, about 300 000 individuals annually (about 3% of total 
                                                 
1 For more information about LINDA, see Edin et al. (2000). 
  4population), representative of the Swedish population from 1960 to 2004. The data base 
also contains information on all family members of a sampled individual, as long as 
they remain in the household. In the following the 2003 sample is used.  
 
The major part of the tax base includes factor income, i.e., labor income and capital 
income, and taxable transfers.  
 
Taxable public transfers include public sickness allowance, pensions, and 
unemployment benefits. They also include taxable parental allowances, study 
allowances, and some other transfers.
 2   Nontaxable public transfers include the 
nontaxable parts of sickness allowances, pensions, and study allowances, which on 
average are fairly negligible. The main parts of this category are family support 
transfers (social allowance, housing allowances, and child allowances).  
 
In Sweden, there are also important taxable non-public transfers arising from collective 
agreements between unions and employers' associations, especially the occupational 
pensions paid out at old age. These give important income insurance; especially for high 
income earners as the public pension system do not replace incomes above a certain 
threshold. As is clear from Figure 2, the occupational pensions are especially important 
in order to smooth the transition into lower retirement income. Also, in case of, e.g., 
unemployment and sickness, collective agreements provide additional income cover to 
individuals. Note that these non-public transfers are taxed as ordinary income but 
financed outside the public system via contributions from employers. These 
contributions are not recorded in the individual tax and transfer register data, which we 
have used here. It is not straightforward to estimate these contributions as they vary 
with the type of collective agreement. Individuals hence receive substantial income 
support if retired or unemployed, etc., that is not financed via the tax bill. One view 
would be to consider these taxable non-public transfers as postponed earnings taxed 
when withdrawn, and not as transfers. This is the assumption for this analysis.  
 
Taxes include income tax, capital tax, tax on real estate, net of deductions, etc. For self-
employed, who represent about 10 percent of the workforce, value-added tax, national 
insurance contributions, payroll tax, and pension contributions are also included. For 
employed such contributions are made by the employer and not registered in these data. 
For the main part of the sample we therefore have no information on social insurance 
contributions and payroll taxes (SIC), which seems to be the case for many countries.
3 
One way to correct for social insurance contributions (SIC) is to adjust the gross labor 
income to the aggregate control given in national income accounts. We then have to 
assume that SIC represents a constant proportion of the gross labor income. This 
measure of SIC is then added to the above measure of taxes. Using national income 
accounts for the year under study (2003), we find that about 51.6 percent of the 
aggregate compensation to employees including aggregate SIC is not accounted for in 
LINDA. This is hence attributed to SIC. Note also that the contributions made from 
                                                 
2 In Sweden saving in private pension insurance grants tax deductions although a cap on the amount is 
about to be instituted. For now, the tax effect of such subsidized savings in private pension insurance is 
neglected. Also, parental allowances (as well as child allowances received by the parent) are attributed to 
the parent and not the prime beneficiary of the time with parent, i.e. the child. 
3 Indirect taxes (on, e.g., alcohol, gas, tobacco and so forth) are not included in our tax measure either. 
  5employers towards the non-public transfers mentioned above will be included in our 
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Figure 1 Age profile of labor and capital incomes (LI and CI), transfers (T), and total, 
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Figure 2 Age profile of transfers: non taxable transfers (NT), public taxable transfers 
(TT publ), and non-public taxable transfers (TT non-public), averages, SEK, 2003 (not 
adjusted to aggregate) 
 
But first, in Figure 1 and Figure 2, we present the unadjusted smoothed levels of the 
different income components using LINDA. One can note that incomes increase from 
age 18 to age 50 from being practically zero before age 15. Incomes associated with 
work then decrease dramatically at the age when most retire and are replaced by taxable 
transfers, mainly pensions from public or non-public sources. Non-taxable transfers are 
significant parts of income only during early adulthood and then slowly decrease as 
  6children moves out of the household to increase somewhat again towards the end of life. 
The latter tendency is highly likely to be a cohort effect though since the oldest 
pensioners are more dependent on non-taxable transfers than the younger cohorts with 
higher income pensions will be. 
 
2.2. Computation of age profiles of net taxes and transfers 
One contribution of the present chapter is to analyze net tax ratios by different age 
groups, something which we believe have not been done systematically before. 
Removing the circular flow that is created for the individuals by the taxation of public 
transfers reduces the income as well as the tax payment.  
 
The main methodological difficulty lies in computing tax rates for parts of the income, 
or attributing shares of the total tax (excluding SIC) to each income component, as it is 
the total income that determines taxes. The method here is deliberately simple and 
chosen more in order to initiate a discussion than as a final solution. We will employ an 
average method, i.e., each income component’s share of total tax (excluding SIC) is 


















Figure 3 Average gross incomes and taxes; (1) including the feedback and (2) excluding 
the feedback, SEK 
 
Figure 3 shows gross incomes and taxes (both including SIC) with and without the 
“feedback”. The feedback biases the impression of which age groups actually are the 
main tax contributors to the public sector. As we would expect the age profile of net tax 
contributions is more hump-shaped over life than the observed gross tax age profile. 
Taxes on public transfers become substantial parts of the gross taxes after retirement 
when they account for the bulk of collected taxes. The reason is of course that public 
transfers become increasingly important by age.  
 
  7This can also be seen by studying the tax ratio. We compute two measures; one that 
includes the feedback (TR1) and one that excludes the feedback (TR2),
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Figure 4. Average tax ratio including the feedback (TR1) and excluding the feedback 
(TR2)  
 
The main result is that, in age groups where a substantial share of total income is public 
transfers, the net tax ratios are substantially smaller than gross tax rates. Up to age 60, 
when the average tax rate reaches its peak over life, the net and gross tax ratios are 
about equal; the rates peak at almost 60 percent around age 55. Around age 65 both the 
average gross tax rate and net tax rates fall, but the net tax rate falls much faster. As can 
be seen from this figure it is mainly for the elderly (65+) that the net and gross tax ratio 
differs. For instance for individuals in their 80s the gross tax ratio is about 35 per cent 
while the net tax ratio is only around 20 per cent. When using net tax rates excluding the 
feedback, we find, on a per capita basis, that the mean age of tax payers drops from 55 
to 48 and the mean age of public transfer recipient increases from 71 to 73; the taxes 
paid falls by 23.2 percent and public transfers received drops by 17.1 percent. 
6
                                                 
4 These are given by, respectively,  1
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, where LI is labor income, CI is capital income, 
NT is non-taxable transfers, TT is taxable transfers, and SIC is social insurance contributions. Using 
national income accounts, SIC is estimated as 51.6 percent of LI+TT non-public. 
5 Note that TR1 and TR2 are calculated as the ratio of the mean of numerator and the mean of 
denominator (by age group). 
6 It can again be noted that these tax rates underestimate the real tax rate as it does not include all 
components, e.g. payroll taxes and direct taxes. On the other hand, in the case of sickness insurance the 
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For anyone not familiar with the Swedish context the levels of the tax rate may seem 
astonishing. The high average tax rates over 50 percent that we get, however, are hardly 
visible for the “average” person since it mainly is a consequence of the added effects of 
social insurance contributions and payroll taxes because these are paid by the employer. 
Only in higher income brackets do such high rates actually apply to any substantial part 
of individual visible income. For the very rich they will most likely be lower since 
capital taxes are flat (and deductions and tax shelters much more easily available). 
2.3. Private  consumption 
Turning to consumption we use expenditure data collected via a survey. The estimated 
age profiles of private consumption are obtained from the Swedish expenditure data 
(HUT 2003), which are household level expenditure data collected in a survey of 4 000 
randomly drawn individuals in ages 0-79 years old from the Total Population Register 
(RTB), thus the 80+ population is not covered. The sample person and the persons 
belonging to his/her household (defined by the household having their main meals 
together) define the survey unit. All household expenses were noted in writing during a 
two-week period in 2003. In a telephone interview questions were posed about less 
frequent or irregular expenditures. Data were complemented by tax register data on land 
leases, fees for unemployment insurance and union membership.
7  
 
The following groups of private consumption are studied in the NTA project: 
•  CFE Private education consumption: tuition fees, books and fees, school 
supplies for all school levels including pre-school and tutoring expenditures. 
•  CFH Private health consumption: out-of-pocket health expenditure and 
reimbursement to health providers by private health insurance companies. 
•  CFK Private capital consumption: imputed rental value of owner-occupied 
housing, and flow of services from consumer durables 
•  CFX Private other consumption 
 
There are some difficulties in adapting the HUT data to these classifications.
8 Note also 
that expenditure is not the same as consumption. In Sweden, the public sector heavily or 
totally subsidizes some good or service consumption, especially in the health and 
education sectors. The part that is subsidized is here considered as public consumption 
but we cannot estimate this from the expenditure data. A description of public 
consumption data is given in the next section.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
first two weeks of benefits are paid by the employer and thus is not recorded as a transfer which becomes 
the case when sickness spells extends beyond this limit. 
7 The sample non-response rate was 42 percent, which is quite high. Sample weights compensating for 
non-response calculated by the Statistics Sweden are used. Nevertheless, a comparison of age profiles for 
income reported in HUT and LINDA (income data are taken from national registers in both LINDA and 
HUT) indicates that the HUT sample seems to be representative with respect to these aggregates. 
8  Insurance expenditures are included in CFX. Durable good consumption is assumed to be the 
depreciated part, one fifth, of current net investments in durables. Taxes and gifts are not included in 
consumption since they are considered transfers. Further, indirect taxes are excluded from all private 
consumption/expenditure measures. 
  9HUT gives the total household private consumption (expenditure) but not the individual 
counterpart. The per capita age profile of consumption has therefore been estimated 
using the age distribution of the household members and the framework of the NTA 
project.
9  
In Figure 5 we present the private consumption. It ends at age 80 due to too few data 
points for 80+. All consumption is smoothed except for education consumption. The 
reason is that we think that education consumption follows discrete jumps by age (the 
same assumption applies for public consumption, see below). All levels have been 
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Figure 5 Private consumption, SEK, 2003 
 
Starting with private education expenses, we see that these are almost entirely due to 
child care fees (including fees for after-school recreation centers for junior school 
children). The amounts are on average very low. There are some minor expenditures 
associated to adulthood (however not visible in the figure), including student union fees, 
literature etc., however, most expenses included in CFE are linked to childhood. The 
expenses for adults might however be explained by age interaction effects, arising from 
                                                 
9 Hence the individual counterparts of CFE and CFH are estimated by regressing consumption at the 
household level on the number of household members in the household in each one-year age-group, 
without an intercept to assure that all household consumption is allocated. CFK (except for durables) and 
CFX are estimated by assuming an “equivalence scale”-rule. We use an “ad-hoc allocation rule” 
(equivalence scale). Instead of estimating the per capita shares individuals of age x will have the 
predetermined weight (1-.6*I(4<x<20)*((20-x)/16)-.6* I (x≤4)) in household consumption, where I(.) is 
the indicator function. Durable consumption is estimated in two steps. In the data we know only the net 
investment in durables but not the stock of durables. First we use the same regression method as for CFE 
and CFH to estimate the age profile of the net investment. Second we assume that all investments have a 
life of 5 years, implying that one fifth of an investment is consumed for the current age group and the rest 
is past on the next, which also consume one fifth of the original investment, and so on. Since the initial 
stock at age 0 this is of course a rather crude approximation.  
10 To avoid influence of underestimated durables the correction factor was calculated without private 
durable consumption. The correction factor was 1.18, which implies that almost one fifth of aggregate 
private consumption was unaccounted for in the HUT survey. 
  10the possibility that parents of different age groups choose different education 
consumption for their kids. It might be that those that raise children relatively later in 
life choose more private child care alternatives or special talent training like music 
education – which infer higher private costs – compared to those that become parents at 
younger ages. A small bump around ages 35-44 is therefore child – not adult –education 
consumption.
11   
 
Private health care consumption is more substantial, but mainly due to dental care and 
medicine for adults below 50, then reaching somewhat higher levels.  
 
For private capital consumption and private other consumption we depict the familiar 
hump shaped pattern over the life. We also note that CFX and CFK totally dominate in 
the consumption pattern.  
 
Note that private capital consumption equals housing rentals since the flow of services 
from consumer durables is presented separately. Private durable consumption is 
initially in life quite high representing the fact that families with new borns allocate a 
high level of resources to meet the demands of the new family member. Some of these 
resources are naturally invested in durables such as cars and furniture and so on. 
Between ages 10-20 the net investments becomes negative implying that the household 
is disinvesting (selling) in durables. Later in life the household again starts to make 
large net investments in durables.  
 
2.4. Public  consumption 
We present public consumption classified into three broad categories: education (child 
care and education), health (health care, elderly care and assistance or aid to 
handicapped), and other public consumption (general public administration, defense, 
police and the administration of justice, trade and industry affairs, environmental 
protection affairs, supply of housing affairs and social progress, recreational activities, 
culture and religion). For all but the last category, consumption has been allocated to 
specific age groups. The age profiles have been estimated from different data sources, 
and adjusted to fit to national levels. The age profiles are presented in Figure 6. 
 
                                                 
11 In an alternative regression for private education consumption we removed these interaction effects by 
including second order effects.  This actually removed the small bump in the first-order effects at age 35-
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Figure 6 Per capita public consumption by category, in SEK, 2003 
 
From the figure we conclude that the age profiles seem quite realistic. For instance, in 
childhood and at old age individuals receive relatively high levels of resources from the 
public sector. In their youth, public sector resources come mainly via child care and 
education (these making marked jumps at distinct ages), while at old age, the services 
come through elderly assistance and health care. When controlling for the fact that only 
few reach such a high age where elderly assistance per capita is so costly, the absolute 
expenses for elderly assistance does not seem too dramatic. Instead education 
consumption becomes more prominent (graph not shown). 
 
Note that there are some clear gaps in the (unsmoothed) age profile for public education 
consumption. These arise from institutional facts, i.e., that child care institutions for 
most individuals end at age 5. When children turn 6 most go to a pre-school year before 
compulsory school. School resources fall from about 130 000 SEK to about 100 000 
SEK as children age from 7 to 15, which is when they end compulsory school. In upper 
secondary school (between ages 16 and 19) resources again rise, etc. We assume that 
the cost per pupil is constant, which may seem questionable. Many schools at 
compulsory school level are an integrated unit. If a school has a large fixed expenditure 
cost that is shared across all age groups of pupils then our measure will be too sensitive 
to fluctuations in the single-year cohort size of pupils. 
 
2.5. Total  consumption 
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Figure 7 Total private and public consumption per capita, in SEK, 2003
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Interestingly, this figure shows that the total per capita consumption profile looks rather 
smooth for age groups below age 75 (just below 200  000 SEK or $35  000), hence 
supporting theories saying that individuals prefer to have about the same level of 
consumption over the whole life cycle and will adapt to the publicly provided 
consumption possibilities by adapting their private consumption. That is except for the 
event that you happen to outlive your expected length of life when you will need more 
care services publicly provided.  
 
The separate components (private and public) appear to be quite good complements, 
i.e., while private consumption is inversely U-shaped (high in the middle age group), we 
find that the public consumption on the contrary is U-shaped. The aggregated 
consumption pattern is therefore much more flat than the two components separately.  
 
2.6. Life cycle deficit 
By comparing the labor income profile and consumption profile we want to describe the 
general life cycle pattern of the life cycle deficit, which is the difference between 
consumption and labor income. Here we use a different measure of labor earnings from 
that we presented in Section 2. First, as discussed in that section we include non-public 
transfers in the measure assuming that these represent delayed earnings. Second, we 
adjust the measure to the aggregate total of compensation to labor using national income 
accounts. In Figure 8 we depict these components weighted by population size and 
normalized to the labor income of age group 30-49.  
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Figure 8 Labor income (incl. non-public transfers), total consumption (private and 
public), and life cycle deficit, SEK, all weighted by population size and normalized to 
labor income of the age group 30-49 
 
One can note that when non-public transfers are counted as delayed payment for labor 
the age profile of labor earnings changes slightly (cf. Figure 1). For instance, the share 
seemingly working at old age will be exaggerated. There is a deficit during childhood 
and young adulthood (before age 25) and old age (63+). As mentioned it is also at these 
ages that the public sector provides the greater part of the total consumption. In the 
middle period (ages 25-63) there is a surplus, and by comparing the areas between the 
consumption and income graphs, we conclude that deficits and surpluses in the 
population as a whole roughly seem to balance. It can be noted that the demographic 
structure seems relatively favorable w.r.t. labor incomes at the moment since there is an 
accumulation of high earners in their 50s and 60s (the “baby boom cohorts”). There is 
also a relatively large cohort born in the 1960s, which, as a group, has high earnings. 
Comparing the 1960s boom cohorts around 40 and the older baby-boom cohort around 
60 we see that the effect on their life cycle deficits differs. For the younger cohort the 
deficit is a bit more favorable (i.e., less negative), and the reason seems to be that 
incomes are better rather than their consumption being lower. One would perhaps have 
expected a higher consumption level of having children still living at home but this 
seems not to be the case.  
 
  142.7. Net private and public transfers 
The life cycle deficit must be supported by transfers by some kind. It is of interest to 
study how the net transfer flows go, separately by the public and the private sector. We 
know that the public sector in Sweden redistribute substantial amounts between 
different age cohorts. Naturally, also outside the public sector individuals in one age 
group make important transfers to other individuals in another age group, in order for 
them to maintain private consumption. Presumably these transfers are made mostly 
within the (extended) family. Here the focus lies in finding out in which age groups 
individuals in Sweden had a higher or lower private consumption than their current 
individual disposable income. This would give an estimate of net private transfers. As 
we still do not know the extent of gifts and bequests at different ages we have no 
information on actual flows.  
 
In Figure 9 we compare the per capita net private transfer (disposable income less 
private consumption) with per capita net public transfer (taxes paid less public 
consumption and public transfers) by age group. Again we normalized the series to the 
labor income of the age group 30-49. This is hence the inverse of the life cycle deficit, 
calculated separately for the private and public sectors. Note that this public net transfer 
is hyphotetical and has nothing to do with actual transfers and benefits which we 
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Figure 9 Net transfers, public and private; per capita, normalized to labor income of the 
age group 30-49.  
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Figure 10 Net transfers, public and private; population weighted and normalized to 
labor income of the age group 30-49. 
 
These data suggest that an individual’s disposable income on average is less than her 
private consumption during childhood and young adulthood. In these ages individuals 
must receive net private transfers (or dissave capital). Both private consumption and 
disposable income start to increase around the age 15, but disposable income increases 
faster, so that when individuals turn 30, they on average have the option to save or make 
private transfers to other generations. The level of average private consumption then 
stays below that of disposable income throughout life.
13 Effectively we thus have no 
dissaving on average at old age and the representative individual will leave his wealth as 
a downward transfer either by inter vivo gifts or bequests. Public net transfers, however, 
are negative after 65. This suggests that in Sweden any life-cycle saving patterns in the 
aggregate are likely to be reflecting the public saving rather than any household saving. 
This should have consequences for the choice of micro foundations in macro models. 
 
To maintain private consumption children and young people in their 20s need transfers 
from cohorts where the disposable income more than covers private consumption. 
Presumably, the main part of these private transfers comes via the family. In a closed 
economy a net inflow of transfers in one age group must be matched by an equal net 
outflow in another age.
14 Data on inheritance would, needless to say, help us 
understanding more. Ideally we would also like expenditure data that tell us to whom 
gifts are given. Yet it is obvious that the major part of intergenerational transfers go via 
the public sector. Particularly at older ages the public sector enables very large 
consumption in terms of old age care. 
 
                                                 
13 However, one should be careful with interpretation for 80+ as we extrapolate private consumption for 
that age group. Note also that the net private transfer is significantly positive at the 5 percent level for 11 
out of the 16 one-year age groups between ages 65-80. 
14  Calculation of the net in- and outflows indeed suggests that they net out almost perfectly; while the net 
inflow amounts to  -3.50 units of prime-age labor income, the net outflow amounts to +3.53 units of 
prime-age labor income . 
  163. Concluding  remarks 
Looking over the whole life, the summed per capita consumption from both the private 
and public side is quite smooth until 75. Data suggest that private consumption 
expenditure w.r.t. education, health and elderly assistance is very small. Instead these 
components dominate public consumption. This lends credibility to the conjecture that 
Swedes on average count on public consumption to complement their private 
consumption.  
 
Data also suggest that a deficit in net private consumption (the difference between 
disposable income and private consumption) during dependency corresponds to an 
equal surplus at other stages (in adulthood). We have shown that the young experience 
an inflow of resources and that more mature adults experience an outflow, and that 
these equal out over the whole population. One should keep in mind however that there 
is a mixture of both age and cohort effects in incomes as well as in consumption in these 
data. Nevertheless it is remarkable that our calculations of disposable income and 
private consumption show no sign of any dissaving at old age. This indicates that the 
role of household life cycle saving in Sweden has been assumed by the public sector. 
The state being a very different player in financial markets than individual households, 
this should have consequences for Swedish macroeconomic models that do not seem to 
have been discussed much. 
 
From the data and measurement methods we use here, it appears as if the working adults 
of the population pay a gross tax rate (which includes social insurance contributions and 
payroll taxes paid by the employer and thus not visible to the employed) of over 50 
percent. For the old age pensioners the picture changes much more substantially with 
net tax rates going down to about 20 percent.  
 
We have not here considered another source of double counting. The dominant part of 
public consumption is labor cost, which is, of course, also taxed. This will be the case in 
other countries, too. Since public employment is a higher share of total employment in 
Sweden than in most countries this may also affect comparisons, however. 
 
It is not clear to what extent we have cohort effects in our cross-section data. From a life 
cycle viewpoint much of taxes are paid in expectation of future benefits and transfers. A 
recent analysis at the Ministry of Finance (Pettersson et al 2006) indicates that although 
there are some cohort differences in the amount of taxes paid and transfers and benefits 
received over the life cycle, these cohort differences are (given assumptions on future 
growth and population) surprisingly small in relation to total life cycle income when 
discounted with the growth rate of per capita GDP. Whether this is an appropriate 
discount method may be disputable but it does indicate that the main cohort inequalities 
arise from the growth rate of the economy rather than from the tax and transfer system 
itself. 
 
It would be interesting to perform further such analyses under the NTA methodology 
and actually compute the net tax rates over the life cycle, but that will require 
substantially more data since historically large changes in the tax and transfer systems 
have taken place.  
 
  17 
 
References 
Edin, P.-A., and P. Fredriksson (2000): “LINDA Longitudinal Individual Data for 
Sweden,” Working paper 19, Department of Economics, Uppsala University. 
 
Thakur, Subhash Madhav; Keen, Michael; Horváth, Balázs and Cerra, Valerie (2003) 
Sweden's Welfare State: Can the Bumblebee Keep Flying? International Monetary 
Fund, Washington DC. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=15894.0
 
SOU (2003), ”Fördelningen ur ett livscykelperspektiv (Distribution from a life cycle 
perspective)” Långtidsutredningen (Long Term Survey) 2003/2004, bil 9, SOU 
2003:110. 
 
Pettersson, Thomas; Pettersson, Tomas and Westerberg, Anna (2006), 
Generationsanalyser – omfördelning mellan generationer i en växande välfärdsstat 
(Generational analyses – redistribution between generations in a growing welfare 
state). Rapport to ESS 2006:6, Ministry of Finance, Stockholm. 
 
  18Former Working papers: 
 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2000:1- 2005:21, see www.framtidsstudier.se. 
 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:1 
Alm, Susanne, Drivkrafter bakom klassresan –kvantitativa data i fallstudiebelysning 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:2 
Duvander, Ann-Zofie, När är det dags för dagis? En studie om vid vilken ålder barn börjar 
förskola och föräldrars åsikt om detta 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:3 
Johansson, Mats, Inkomst och ojämlikhet i Sverige 1951-2002 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:4 
Malmberg, Bo & Eva Andersson, Health as a factor in regional economic development 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:5 
Estrada, Felipe & Anders Nilsson, Segregation och utsatthet för egendomsbrott. - Betydelsen 
av bostadsområdets resurser och individuella riskfaktorer 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:6 
Amcoff, Jan & Erik Westholm, Understanding rural change – demography as a key to the 
future 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:7 
Lundqvist, Torbjörn, The Sustainable Society in Swedish Politics – Renewal and Continuity 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:8 
Lundqvist, Torbjörn, Competition Policy and the Swedish Model.  
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:9 
de la Croix, David, Lindh, Thomas & Bo Malmberg, Growth and Longevity from the Industrial 
Revolution to the Future of an Aging Society.   
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:10 
Kangas, Olli, Lundberg, Urban & Niels Ploug, Three routes to a pension reform. Politics and 
institutions in reforming pensions in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:11 
Korpi, Martin, Does Size of Local Labour Markets Affect Wage Inequality? A Rank-size Rule of 
Income Distribution 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:12 
Lindbom, Anders, The Swedish Conservative Party and the Welfare State. Institutional 
Change and Adapting Preferences. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:13 
Enström Öst, Cecilia, Bostadsbidrag och trångboddhet. Har 1997 års bostadsbidragsreform 
förbättrat bostadssituationen för barnen? 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:1 
Nahum, Ruth-Aïda, Child Health and Family Income. Physical and Psychosocial Health. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:2 
Nahum, Ruth-Aïda, Labour Supply Response to Spousal Sickness Absence. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:3 
Brännström, Lars, Making their mark. Disentangling the Effects of Neighbourhood and School 
Environments on Educational Achievement. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:4 
Lindh, Thomas & Urban Lundberg, Predicaments in the futures of aging democracies. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:5 
Ryan, Paul, Has the youth labour market deteriorated in recent decades? Evidence from 
developed countries. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:6 
Baroni, Elisa, Pension Systems and Pension Reform in an Aging Society. An Introduction to 
Innthe Debate. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:7 
Amcoff, Jan, Regionförstoring – idé, mätproblem och framtidsutsikter 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:8 
Johansson, Mats & Katarina Katz, Wage differences between women and men in Sweden – 
the impact of skill mismatch 
 Former Working papers: 
 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2000:1- 2005:21, see www.framtidsstudier.se. 
 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:1 
Alm, Susanne, Drivkrafter bakom klassresan –kvantitativa data i fallstudiebelysning 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:2 
Duvander, Ann-Zofie, När är det dags för dagis? En studie om vid vilken ålder barn börjar 
förskola och föräldrars åsikt om detta 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:3 
Johansson, Mats, Inkomst och ojämlikhet i Sverige 1951-2002 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:4 
Malmberg, Bo & Eva Andersson, Health as a factor in regional economic development 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:5 
Estrada, Felipe & Anders Nilsson, Segregation och utsatthet för egendomsbrott. - Betydelsen 
av bostadsområdets resurser och individuella riskfaktorer 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:6 
Amcoff, Jan & Erik Westholm, Understanding rural change – demography as a key to the 
future 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:7 
Lundqvist, Torbjörn, The Sustainable Society in Swedish Politics – Renewal and Continuity 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:8 
Lundqvist, Torbjörn, Competition Policy and the Swedish Model.  
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:9 
de la Croix, David, Lindh, Thomas & Bo Malmberg, Growth and Longevity from the Industrial 
Revolution to the Future of an Aging Society.   
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:10 
Kangas, Olli, Lundberg, Urban & Niels Ploug, Three routes to a pension reform. Politics and 
institutions in reforming pensions in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:11 
Korpi, Martin, Does Size of Local Labour Markets Affect Wage Inequality? A Rank-size Rule of 
Income Distribution 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:12 
Lindbom, Anders, The Swedish Conservative Party and the Welfare State. Institutional 
Change and Adapting Preferences. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2006:13 
Enström Öst, Cecilia, Bostadsbidrag och trångboddhet. Har 1997 års bostadsbidragsreform 
förbättrat bostadssituationen för barnen? 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:1 
Nahum, Ruth-Aïda, Child Health and Family Income. Physical and Psychosocial Health. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:2 
Nahum, Ruth-Aïda, Labour Supply Response to Spousal Sickness Absence. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:3 
Brännström, Lars, Making their mark. Disentangling the Effects of Neighbourhood and School 
Environments on Educational Achievement. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:4 
Lindh, Thomas & Urban Lundberg, Predicaments in the futures of aging democracies. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:5 
Ryan, Paul, Has the youth labour market deteriorated in recent decades? Evidence from 
developed countries. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:6 
Baroni, Elisa, Pension Systems and Pension Reform in an Aging Society. An Introduction to 
Innthe Debate. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:7 
Amcoff, Jan, Regionförstoring – idé, mätproblem och framtidsutsikter 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:8 
Johansson, Mats & Katarina Katz, Wage differences between women and men in Sweden – 





•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:9 
Alm, Susanne, Det effektiva samhället eller det goda livet? Svenska framtidsstudier om 
arbetsliv och fritid från 1970- till 1990-tal. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:10 
Sevilla, Jaypee, Age structure and productivity growth 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:11 
Sevilla, Jaypee, Fertility and relative cohort size 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:12 
Steedman, Hilary, Adapting to Globalised Product and Labour Markets 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:13 
Bäckman, Olof & Anders Nilsson, Childhood Poverty and Labour Market Exclusion 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:14 
Dahlgren, Göran & Margaret Whitehead, Policies and strategies to promote social equity in 
health 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:1 
Westholm, Erik & Cecilia Waldenström, Kunskap om landsbygden. Dags för en ny agenda! 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:2 
Gartell, Marie, Jans, Ann-Christin & Helena Persson, The importance of education for the 
reallocation of labor. Evidence from Swedish linked employer-employee data 1986-2002 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:3 
Strömblad, Per & Gunnar Myrberg, Urban Inequality and Political Recruitment Networks. 
 
 